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 On what does the meaning of the concept of water depend?  I consider three 
possible answers: the physical world, theory, or both the physical world and theory.  Each 
answer supports a particular history.  If the history unique to an answer is confirmed by 
the actual history of the concept of water, then there is supporting evidence for that 
account of meaning.   
 I have documented the historical development of the concept of water, focusing 
on three periods: the ancient Greeks, the 18th and 19th centuries, and the 20th and 21st 
centuries.  Conceptual change figures prominently in that history, and when enough 
historical data are available communication across theories is obvious. 
 Those features suggest that the meaning of the concept of water depends on the 
physical world and the theory in which it is embedded.  The physical world explains 
cross theory communication; and theory accounts for the conceptual changes that I have 
documented.  
 The history of the concept of water suggests that Putnam (1975) is right: meaning 
depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded.  He’s right, 
however, for the wrong reasons.  Putnam relies on a thought experiment to demonstrate 
that the physical world contributes to meaning, but the history suggests that he built some 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
 A theory of meaning should answer the question: on what does the meaning of a 
concept depend?  I shall not respond to that general question, but I shall try to answer a 
special one: on what does the meaning of the concept of water depend?  I shall consider 
three possible answers:   
M1: The meaning of a concept only depends on its relation to the physical world. 
M2: The meaning of a concept only depends on the theory in which it is embedded.  
M3: The meaning of a concept depends on both the physical world and the theory in 
which it is embedded. 
 Philosophers have different ideas about concepts.  Here, Like Thagard (1992), I 
shall treat concepts as mental representations, which correspond to predicates.  The 
concept of water corresponds to the predicate of the same name. 
The world, in this context, is environment; however, it is the physical 
environment.  The physical environment is distinguished from the social one, which 
Wittgenstein (1953) had thought determined the meaning of a concept.  
 Broadly, a theory is a system of concepts that are connected by the claims of the 
theory.  The extreme of this view is that a theory or conceptual system determines the 
world within which one works, not the reverse (Kuhn, 1961). 
 I plan to evaluate M1, M2, and M3 using the historical analysis common in the 
historical philosophy of science.  Each account of meaning makes historical predictions. 
Provided an account is correct, a set of historical predictions follows, which can be 
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evaluated against the actual history.  If M1, M2, or M3’s predicted history matches the 
actual one, then there is evidence for it; otherwise, there is evidence against it. The 
historical scenarios of M1, M2, and M3 are as follows:   
H1: if M1 is right, then the history of the concept of water should be relatively stable, 
and, consequently, communication should be possible.   
H2: if M2 is right, then one should expect dramatic conceptual shifts to mark the history 
of the concept of water, and, as a result, communication between people working within 
different theories should be near impossible. 
H3: if M3 is right, the history of the concept of water should include stable and unstable 
features.  Either the historical development of the concept of water is relatively stable and 
cross-theory communication is impossible, or the history of the concept of water is 
unstable, and cross-theory communication is possible.  
 H1 follows from M1 and one other assumption: the physical world is relatively 
stable with respect to its naturally occurring substances.  If both assumptions are correct, 
we should expect the meaning of the concept of water to be relatively stable throughout 
history, which allows communication between people working within different theories.   
 H2 follows from M2 and one other assumption: the world changes with a theory 
change (Kuhn, 1996, p. 111).  Provided both assumptions are right, dramatic conceptual 
shifts will characterize the historical development of the concept of water; consequently, 
cross-theory communication would be near impossible because speakers of different 
theories would intend different meanings but use the same word. 
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 If the history supports H3, then the history will include stable elements and 
volatile ones.  The stability is a result of the physical world, and the volatility is a 
consequence of theory changes.  
 Notice that the two salient features of the possible histories are conceptual change 
and cross-theory communication.  The presence or absence of either of these two features 
from the history of the concept of water will decide which account of meaning best fits 
with the historical development of the concept of water.  To make the comparison 
possible, I shall trace the changes in the concept of water, and evaluate communication 
between individuals working across different conceptual systems.  For clarity, I shall 
designate concepts by small capitals (WATER), words with double quotation marks 
(“water”), and objects with plain text (water). 
 My research indicates that the actual history best fits with H3.  Dramatic 
conceptual changes characterize the historical development of WATER, which Kuhn 
(1989; 1990) had anticipated; yet, when enough historical information is available the 
record suggests that communication happens across theories.  Therefore the meaning of 
WATER has at least two factors: its relationship to other concepts in a theory, and its 
relationship to the physical world.   
 The physical world explains cross-theory communication.  The physical world is 
relatively stable.  And the dramatic conceptual changes are due to theory change.  The 
fact that I have documented both cross-theory communication and dramatic conceptual 
changes in the history of the concept of water suggest that M3 is right.  The meaning of 
WATER depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded. 
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 The historical analysis also shows that though Twin Earth’s conclusion that the 
meaning of WATER depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded 
is right, but it is right for the wrong reasons.  Based on recent scientific investigation, 
specifically as it relates to mass variant water molecules, it is clear that at least one of 
Putnam’s assumptions concerning the Twin Earth thought experiment is chemically 
implausible. 
 Putnam aside, Kuhn’s thesis that communication is nearly impossible between 
speakers of different theories or conceptual systems does not fit the history either.  
Kuhn’s argument about communication was a result of his historical work, but when 
enough historical information is available, it is clear that cross-theory communication 
happens. 
 The application of my research is limited for two reasons.  First, I have only used 
it to suggest that there are at least two dimensions to meaning; however, it does not 
eliminate the possibility that, upon refinement, meaning is actually a dependent of three 
or more factors.  Second, my research is only on WATER, and may only apply to the 
concepts of other natural entities.    
 The history I have developed relies on the distinction between belief revision and 
conceptual change.  Belief revision is a process whereby a belief is either added or 
eliminated (Thagard, 1992, 1999).  For instance, a solution might be thought acidic, yet 
upon chemical analysis, say a simple litmus test, the solution is determined neutral.  The 
belief that the solution is acidic would be eliminated, and a new belief that the solution is 
neutral is added to one’s beliefs. That kind of belief revision does not cause meaning 
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change.  Thus, when the pH of a solution is determined to be neutral, the meaning of 
‘acidity’ and ‘neutrality’ are not changed.  These two kinds of belief revision are:   
1. Adding a new instance, for example that liquid is water.   
2. Deleting an instance, for example we believed that liquid was water, but our 
investigation tells us it is not. 
 
 Belief revision does not alter the meanings of concepts because it operates 
independently of considerations of conceptual structure, but more radical conceptual 
change alters a concepts structure (Thagard, 1992, 1999).  These kinds of changes adjust 
the concept’s relationship to other concepts and the world (Thagard, 2003).  Constructing 
the history of the concept of water, I have noticed five kinds of conceptual change: 
1. Differentiation:  introducing new distinctions into a concept.  These distinctions      
divide one concept into two or more.   
 
2. Coalescence: collapsing previous distinctions.  This process eliminates the 
distinctions between two or more concepts. 
 
3. Reclassification: moving a concept from one category in a conceptual system to 
another.  
 
4. Reorganization:  changing the organizational principle of the conceptual system.  
 
5. Redescription:  interpreting observations with a different conceptual system.  
 
 
I have divided WATER’S history into three major periods: the Greeks, 18th and 19th 
century changes, and 20th and 21st century developments.  Conceptual change occurs in 
and between each of the three periods.  It is not clear if cross-theory communication 
happens at every stage of development, but there is enough historical information during 
the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries to conclude that communication across theories 
happens.  I shall now describe the central changes that have taken place in the concept of 
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water, and when possible highlight cross-theory communication.  Once that is complete I 






















 In this chapter I shall investigate three historical developments of the concept of 
water with an eye toward the conceptual changes that characterize each shift.  I shall 
begin with ancient Greek myth, and develop a fragment of that worldview as it relates to 
water.  Next I shall elaborate on Thales’ view, and explain the differences.  I shall end 
with Aristotle’s revisions to Thales’ theory. 
From the history I shall conclude:  1) the pre-scientific Greek concepts of water 
were based on water’s visible properties; 2) Thales’ shift to the second stage of 
development involved collapsing some of the prior distinctions that had been based on 
water’s observable properties and the replacement of the organizing principle of the 
conceptual system; and 3) Aristotle’s revision of Thales’ view added four more 
substances. 
 
Myth, Gods, and Concepts 
The myths of literate ancient cultures have been recorded in poetry, plays, and 
prose.  Expressions of these myths are found in sculpture, painting, and architecture.  For 
many pre-scientific cultures myth set the context wherein observations were assimilated, 
conceptualized, and explained. Myth provides a pre-scientific conceptual system that 
categorizes, orders, and explains content.   
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Greek concepts prior to 620 BCE were understood in the context of myth.  The 
poetry of Homer (900-800BCE) and Hesiod (700 BCE) are the principal sources of them, 
which were later recounted by Pseudo-Apollodorus (100 BCE).  These stories reveal the 
Ancient Greek’s conceptual system: their concepts, and their organization.  
A Greek god is an artificial figure with human qualities, which is associated with 
an abstraction, or a natural entity (Webster, 1954, p. 10).  Consequently, a god is a clue to 
the concepts in the pre-scientific Greek worldview—concepts for abstractions and for 
natural entities.  Second, myth orders a god’s relationship to another god (Sale, 1965, p. 
668).  By approximate substitution the relationship between the gods is a rough mapping 
of a relationship between concepts, given a god more-or-less is associated with a concept.   
 The most well known figures in Greek myth are the Olympians:  Zeus, Hades, and 
Poseidon among them.  Some of these gods personify natural entities: Zeus personifies 
the sky, and Poseidon the sea (Hesiod, trans. 1914, 453).1  The first gods that come into 
existence, however, are not the Olympians, but rather, the Protogenoi.  They are the 
figures of mythical cosmology (Hesoid, trans. 1914, 116-138).  
 In one influential account of the origin of the universe, Hesoid names three gods 
that come into existence from nothing: Chaos, Gaia, and Eros (Hesoid, trans. 1914, 116-
120).  They are the gods from which all the other gods descend.  As first beings and 
parental figures, one might speculate that the concepts they are associated with are the 
most important.  
 The Protogenoi are supernatural entities that came into existence at the beginning 
of the universe (Hesiod, trans. 1914, 116).  I concentrate on those Protogenoi that relate 
                                                
1 In this passage Hesoid does not refer to Poseidon by name but by “the loud crashing Earth-Shaker”, an 
associated concept.  The concept and the name appear to be used interchangeably. 
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to water.  And I shall outline two genealogical fragments of the Protogenoi that relate to 
it.  The genealogy will serve as evidence for, and an elaboration of, the following two 
ideas:  1) a Greek god is associated with a loosely defined concept in the pre-scientific 
Greek worldview; and 2) a god’s relationship to another suggests a hierarchical 
connection between the gods and their respective concepts.  
 
 
                                               




                           
Figure 2.0 Fragment of the Greek Protogenoi Lineage (Hesiod, Trans. 1914, 116-138):  
circles represent concepts, squares represent gods, double arrows associations, and the addition 
sign represent procreation.  Uranus and Gaia are the second and third beings to come into 
existence according to Hesoid.  Tethys and Oceanus are water deities, and represent different 
kinds of water.  Though Tethys and Oceanus have parents, the Theogony still groups them with 
the Protogenoi.  
 
 
Notice that this genealogical fragment pairs a deity with a concept.  Each god is a 
supernatural manifestation of his or her paired concept, modeled after human form, and 
given human psychology; consequently, a god is a personification of a concept.  Much as 
our scientific understanding of the universe is encoded in the modern Periodic Table of 
The Elements, the Greek poetic and metaphorical interpretation of the universe manifests 






Uranus Gaia  
Earth Sky 
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 This pairing immediately substantiates the first idea: a Greek god is a personified 
concept.  That personification allows us to say that a Greek god roughly maps onto a 
concept.  Through their mythical stories, the originators of these myths picked out the 
differences they thought important, and thereby built the concepts with which they 
viewed the world.  The divine representatives are clues to the concepts in the pre-
scientific Greek worldview.   
 The genealogical fragments also imply a familial hierarchy that organizes the 
gods.  That familial hierarchy sets the relationships between the gods, and the concepts 
they personify.  It shows how the pre-scientific Greeks viewed the organization of their 
concepts.  Genealogy is only one part of the organization, however.  Greek myth is also 
filled with stories of conflict between the gods.  The outcomes of those stories also order, 
gods by relative power.  Therefore both genealogy and social interaction organize the 
gods and their associated concepts.  
For instance, Tethys is the god of fresh water, which suggests that the pre-
scientific Greeks had a concept of fresh water.  Tethys’ divinity and role in Greek myth 
suggests that FRESH WATER is a differentiated concept in pre-scientific Greek conceptual 
system.   
 If I am right about myth’s role in the organization of pre-scientific Greek 
concepts, then in many cases they look dramatically different than current ones.  This is 
certainly the case for our concept of water.  Greek myth suggests that pre-scientific 
Greeks had many concepts of water based on its different visible properties. 
Considering only the Greek Protogenoi there are at least two separate concepts of 
water for the pre-scientific Greeks:  FRESH WATER, and OCEAN WATER.  Tethys, and 
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Oceanus represent these concepts (Hesiod, trans. 1914, 116-138).  However, had I 
included the complete Greek Pantheon, then the number of concepts associated with 
water would multiple dramatically.   
 For instance, certain nymphs personified sea brine, foam, colour, and movement 
(see Hesiod, trans. 1914, 240, 349; Apollodorus, trans. 1921, 1.2).  If the assignment of 
a deity to a thing picks that thing out as a differentiated concept, then Greek mythology 
suggests that the pre-scientific Greeks divided what we now classify as properties of 
water into separate concepts of water: SEA BRINE, SEA FOAM, SEA COLOUR, SEA 
MOVEMENT.  All of these things are assigned divine representatives, suggesting that they 
are differentiated concepts within the pre-scientific conceptual system.  The god 
hierarchy then organizes these concepts.  
 The Greek Pantheon is a clue to the conceptual system of the pre-scientific 
Greeks.  That system, however, is not easily translated into our own.  Below is a 
simplified and partly inaccurate attempt to translate the pre-scientific Greek view of 



















 Figure 2.1 Fragment of one possible pre-scientific Greek representation of water’s associated 
concepts.  Straight lines represent kind relations.  The concept of liquid might be substituted for the concept 
of water.  I have also take liberty to disassociate the concepts from their paired deities.   
 
From this survey of myths, we can see how pre-scientific Greeks, a seafaring 
group of island dwellers, differentiated their concepts of water by its various visible 
properties: fresh, salt, ocean, foam, brine, sea.  And they ordered them using mythical 
stories of figures that personified them.  This research is an incomplete survey of the 
Greek deities associated with the various properties of water, it is possible that a complete 
catalog would reveal more water deities, and, consequently, more concepts of water. 
These divine figures are not only clues to the concepts of the pre-scientific 
Greeks, but are also invoked to explain the observations associated with the concept. 
These gods had the power to, among other things, alter waves and currents, influence the 
growth of sea flora and fauna, and cause droughts and floods.  Apollodorus, for example, 
recounts two myths associated with drought and flood.  The inhabitants of Rhodes, 
Apollodorus writes, declared that Rhodes belonged to Hera.  In anger, Poseidon punished 
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the people of Rhodes by drying up all the bodies of fresh water, leaving the land 
completely waterless (Apollodorus, trans. 1921, 2.1.4).  On another occasion an 
Ethiopian princess claimed that her beauty exceeded that of the Nereids, the 
personifications of different elements of the sea.  Poseidon, sharing their anger, sent a 
flood to punish the people of Ethiopia (Apollodorus, trans. 1921, 2.4.3).  Many similar 
examples are found in Odysseus’s tortuous voyage home in Homer’s Odyssey.  Thus 
waves, currents, sea flora and fauna, droughts, and floods were often explained in pre-
scientific Greek literature in terms of the gods who caused them.   
  Notice that our concept of water figures into the pre-scientific Greek worldview. 
FRESH WATER and OCEAN WATER are in our conceptual system, but on our current view 
they are not simples, but mixes; furthermore, we think those mixtures share a common 
constituent; however, on this interpretation the pre-scientific Greeks did not.  Nowhere in 
the pre-scientific Greek worldview does anything resembling our concept of water exist.   
 
Thales, Aristotle, and the Shift to Natural Entities  
 The mythical stage gave way to a qualitative one.  At this stage natural entities, 
rather than supernatural ones, differentiated concepts and ordered them. Qualitative 
explanations of the observations associated with water probably began between 620 BCE 
and 546 BCE with Thales of Miletus.  Because no primary documents exist, our best 
source for Thales’ ideas about water is Aristotle who recounts them in Metaphysics and 
other places.  Excerpts from Metaphysics show this much:  1) Thales thought that water 
was the basic material, and, therefore, collapsed the differences associated with the 
previous mythical conceptual system; 2) Thales reorganized these concepts based on their 
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relationship to water, the primary substance; and 3) Thales believed that water was the 
material cause of all things, and, thus, appealed to water to explained everything 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. 1953, sec. 983 b10, b25). 
 Thales thought that water was the basic material and the primary cause of all other 
things (Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. 1953, sec. 983 b20).  Viewing the world this way, 
all things were believed to be water in a different state; that is, all things were 
modifications of water, the primary substance.  Before Thales the ancient Greeks thought 
that different occurrences of water were different kinds of things, and had different 
concepts for them.  Thales collapsed those differences.  He eliminated the distinctions 
between FRESH WATER, and SEA WATER, and the other concepts associated with the pre-
scientific concept of water.  
 Today solid, liquid, and gas are considered physical states of matter.  Thales 
believed that air, earth, and fire were physical state of water.  It is not far fetched to say 
that Thales concept of water resembles our concept of matter.   
 Thales thought that water brought other things into existence, air, earth and fire 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. 1953, 983 b7-18).  He supposed that as water changed 
states from liquid to gas, air and clouds were created.  As water condensed and returned 
to the earth as a liquid it thickened into slime and mud, and eventually became earth and 
stone (Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. 1953, 983 b22-28).  Thus Thales ordered things in 
terms of their relationship to the primary substance water.  There are things that water 
nourishes and things that water creates or becomes.  Water nourishes living bodies and 
the sun, while it transforms into air, earth, and fire.  In fact, Thales thought that water had 









Figure 2.2.  Fragment of Thales’s conceptual system interpreted from by Aristotle 
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. 1922, sec. 983).  Straight lines indicate kind-relations.   
 
Given that Thales thought water was the most basic material, and that all other things 
were the result of its transformations, he organized concepts by their relationship to his 
concept of water.  The Greeks before him used myth to understand their concepts, 
organizing them into a hierarchy of associated gods that personified concepts.  Thales 
abandoned myth as an ordering principle in favor of the natural entities. 
 For instance, Thales explained cloud formation and air creation through the 
evaporation of water; he explained land formation—the build-up of silt on the banks of 
seas and rivers—as the condensation of water and its thickening.  By another change of 
state water became fire.  All things came into existence through water transforming into 
other states. 
 Aristotle thought that Thales’ theory could not account for the apparent 
opposition of earth and fire, and air and water (Aristotle, trans. 1930, sec. III).  Given the 
apparent opposition, he reasoned that it was impossible to reduce one opposite to another 
(Aristotle, trans. 1930, Sec. III).  For this reason Aristotle revised Thales’s conceptual 
















Figure 2.3. Fragment of Aristotle’s conceptual system (Aristotle, De Generatione et 
Corruption, trans. 1930, sec. III).  Straight lines indicate kind relations. 
 
 Water remained classified as an elemental substance, though it no longer occupied 
that position alone. Aristotle classified air, earth, and fire as elemental substances, and 
added another, aether (a divine substance that makes up stars and planets).  As a result 
water could not be the single cause of everything; and air, earth, and fire were not 
manifestations of it. 
 
Conclusion 
 The pre-scientific Greeks differentiated WATER by the properties they thought 
were important.  If I am right, and the Greek Pantheon roughly maps onto the pre-
scientific Greek concepts, then each concept should be an elementary-simple akin to the 
elements of the Periodic Table.  The pre-scientific Greeks differentiated their concepts 
related to water by macro-visible properties.  It is not clear that they thought that they 
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 17 
 We have examined, so far, two major shifts in the evolution of WATER: 1) a 
change from a mythical to a qualitative view entailed changing the organizing principle 
of the conceptual system from one based on the stories of myth to one based on natural 
entities.  Thales collapsed the distinctions associated with the pre-scientific concepts of 
water, and concluded that water was the most primary substance, and, therefore, all 
things were a transformation of it; and 2) Aristotle revised Thales view by adding four 
other primary substances or elements.   



























Chapter 3  
 






 Aristotle’s thoughts on natural philosophy exercised a powerful effect well into 
the Middle Ages, and its influence lingered into the 17th century. For that reason this 
chapter skips ahead, chronologically, almost two thousand years.  My aims in this chapter 
are a continuation of the last.  I shall examine two historical periods, with an eye on the 
conceptual changes that mark each shift. I shall begin with the Birmingham natural 
philosophers and their experiments on air; the isolation of the component parts of water; 
and the interpretation of those observations. I shall end with Lavoisier’s reinterpretation 
of the same experimental observations. 
 From the history I shall conclude:  1) The shift from Aristotle to the Birmingham 
natural philosophers required a reclassification of water, from element to compound; and 
2) The shift from the Birmingham philosophers understanding of water to Lavoisier’s 
involved a reinterpretation of water’s parts, though water continued to be classified as a 
compound. 
 
The English Reclassification of Water From Element to Compound  
 
 Though Stahl had made important changes to Aristotle’s conceptual system in the 
beginning of the 17th century, fragments of Aristotle’s system survived almost seventy 
years after Stahl.  Still, Stahl’s reorganization of Aristotle’s system continued to classify 
water as an element (Thagard, 1992, p. 41).  That view, however, was abandoned in the 
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mid-18th century when Joseph Priestley and Henry Cavendish began a program that 
investigated air.  Their results first suggested that there were many kinds of air, which 
ultimately implied that water is not elementary, but rather, the union of airs. 
 Priestley and Cavendish interpreted the results of their experiments on air within 
Stahl’s conceptual system.  Stahl divided the elementary into water and earths, and earths 
into three types: verifiable, liquefiable, and phlogiston (Stahl, trans. 1730, p. 36). 
Phlogiston, Stahl thought, was a kind of inflammable principle: a substance that could not 
be burned and had the potential to extinguish fire if present in abundance (Stahl, trans. 
1730, p. 36). 
 The concept ‘phlogiston’ is vital here.  The Birmingham natural philosophers 
working within Stahl’s conceptual system believed that phlogiston was a natural entity.  
















Figure 3.0. Fragment of Stahl’s conceptual system in 1723 (Thagard 1992: 41). Straight 
lines indicate kind-relations. Taken from Conceptual Revolutions. This depiction is incomplete 
because I have only included enough to show the reorganization after Watt’s interpretation of 















 With this conceptual system in the background, Henry Cavendish (1766) isolated 
inflammable air (hydrogen gas), and Joseph Priestly (1775) isolated ‘dephlogisticated’ air 
(oxygen gas).  Though it is clear that Priestly did not immediately recognize that these 
airs were component parts of water, Cavendish’s thoughts are not nearly as obvious.  
Cavendish isolated what he thought to be inflammable air or pure phlogiston.  He 
produced this air by dissolving certain metals (namely, zinc, iron, and tin) in certain acids 
(namely, vitriolic acid, spirit of salt, or nitrous acid).  He then captured the emitted air. 
Cavendish’s observations (Cavendish, 1766, p. 144-146) suggest the following reaction, 
which I have written as a modern chemical equation: 
 
Zinc(s) + Spirit of Salt(l)  Phlogiston(g) + Zinc Calx(s) + Spirit of Salt(l) + Heat 
 
Equation 3.0.  I have written the names of the chemical entities as Cavendish recorded 
them.  I added subscripts that indicate the state of the entities: (g) indicates a gas, (l) indicates a 
liquid, and (s) indicates a solid. 
 
Cavendish observed that the Zinc lost mass in the reaction while the Spirit of Salt lost 
volume.  Phlogiston, Cavendish thought, was liberated from zinc by the acid.  In the 
process, heat was released, and Zinc was reduced to its calx (Cavendish, 1766, p. 145-
146).  
Cavendish captured some of this air in a flask.  Testing it, he noticed that the air 
extinguished a candle flame; indeed, no flame could survive in the presence of this air, 
hence its phlogistic interpretation.  Cavendish presumed that this air was, in fact, 
phlogiston in a gaseous state (Cavendish, 1766). 
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Priestly isolated dephlogisticated air or air absent phlogiston by mixing the dried 
calx of certain metals2, namely, gold, silver, and copper in nitrous acid.  After the 
reaction Priestly collected and isolated many different kinds of air, one being 
dephlogisticated air.  Priestly’s observations (Priestly, 1977, p. 55-65) suggest the 
following reactions, which I have written as two modern chemical equations:  
 
(1) Copper Calx(s) + Spirit of Nitre(l)  Copper Nitre(l) + Fixed Air(g)  
(2) Lime Water(l) + Fixed Air(g)  Turbid Lime Water(l) + Nitrous Air(g) +                               
Dephlogisticated Air(g) 
 
Equation 3.1. I have written the names of the chemical entities as Priestly recorded them.  
I added subscripts that indicate the state of the entities: (g) indicates a gas, (l) indicates a liquid, 
and (s) indicates a solid. 
  
 
Priestly recovered the calx of copper by dissolving it in oil of vitriol.  He dried the calx, 
mixed it with spirit of nitre and captured fixed air, then mixed the fixed air with lime 
water to recover and nitrous dephlogisticated air (Priestly, 1775; 1777, p. 60-61).   
Having captured the air, he investigated its properties and observed that a flame in 
the presence of dephlogisticated air burns stronger and brighter than in the presence of 
common air.  He had also designed experiments that suggested that respiration is best in 
the presence of dephlogisticated air (Priestly, 1775, p. 386-388). 
 Cavendish and Priestly isolated what are now known as hydrogen and oxygen 
gases—the constituent parts of water. Water’s composition is now elementary 
knowledge, but this knowledge did not come easily.  Despite experimenting with both 
gases, neither Priestly nor Cavendish immediately inferred water’s composition.   Priestly 
                                                
2 Though the state of the metal might seem a negligible difference, it’s considerable.  What 18th 
century scientists called the calx of the metal, was the metal oxidized.  With that in mind, 
Priestly’s observations should be unsurprising. 
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(1783; 1785) and Cavendish (1784) conducted experiments that involved both gases, 
which they had reported produced a dew, but water’s composition still evaded them.  
Only after considerable thought did Cavendish and his friend James Watt begin to think 
that water could be the product of these two airs.  Priestly, on the other hand, despite 
performing some of these experiments himself, remained skeptical.  He was one of the 
last among his peers to accept that water consisted of inflammable and dephlogisticated 
airs, though his and Cavendish’s experiments were the first step in this direction. 
In Priestley’s last volume of experiments, he discusses an anomaly, which 
Cavendish investigated (Cavendish, 1784, p. 126).  He observed that a mixture of 
common and inflammable airs ignited by an electric spark resulted in a weight loss of the 
airs.  He also noticed that the vessel wherein the reaction occurred, though dry prior to 
the reaction, had accumulated moisture on the wall of the vessel.  Priestly initially 
explained this observation within Stahl’s conceptual system concluding that the water 
was carried in the common air and liberated when that air was phlogisticated (Cavendish, 
1784, p.126).  Priestley’s explanation kept Stahl’s conceptual system intact. 
Unsatisfied with Priestly’s observations and conclusions, Cavendish replicated 





Weight Loss Air 
Remaining 
Test One Standard 
1 1.241 .682 1.555 .055 .0 
1 1.055 .641 1.413 .063 .0 
1 .705 .647 1.059 .066 .0 
1 .423 .612 .811 .097 .03 
1 .331 .476 .855 .339 .27 
1 .206 .294 .912 .048 .58 
 
Table 3.0.  Taken from Cavendish’s Experiments on Air 1784.  Note that the final 
column represents the remaining ‘inflammable air’ after the explosion. The table shows that the 
more inflammable air is reacted with common air the higher the resultant weight loss of the airs.  
The measure of inflammable air is expressed in decimals of the common air. 
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Completing his experiments, Cavendish explained the anomaly differently.  He notes that 
the “423 measures of inflammable air are nearly sufficient to completely phlogisticate 
1000 of common air” (Cavendish, 1784, p. 128). He concluded that almost all the 
inflammable air, and about one-fifth of the common air, had condensed into dew when 
exploded.3 Refer to row four of the table above.  Investigating this dew, Cavendish 
concluded it was pure water (Cavendish, 1784, p. 129). 
 Knowing that common air consisted of many airs, this experiment suggested 
another: Cavendish filled a glass globe with a mixture of inflammable and 
dephlogisticated airs, at an almost two-to-one ratio (Cavendish, 1784, p. 130).4  Then he 
exploded the airs with an electrical spark.  Cavendish examined the dew produced from 
the explosion and, after some tests, concluded that it was acidic, as Priestly had reported.   
However, when he changed the proportions to one part inflammable air to ten 
parts dephlogisticated air, Cavendish observed that the dew produced was pure water. In 
this case, he thought, the dephlogisticated air had been completely phlogisticated.  
Ultimately Cavendish concluded that “when a mixture of inflammable and 
dephlogisticated air is exploded in such proportion that the burnt air is not much 
phlogisticated, the condensed liquor contains a little acid, which is always of the nitrous 
kind, whatever substance the dephlogisticated air is procured from; but if the proportion 
be such that the burnt air is almost completely phlogisticated, the condensed liquor is not 
at all acid, but seems pure water, without any addition whatever” (Cavendish, 1784, p. 
132). 
                                                
3 This observation is consistent with the proportion of oxygen in atmospheric air as oxygen is 
makes up approximately twenty percent of the earth’s atmosphere.   
4 Though one might expect the first experiment to produce water because hydrogen and oxygen 
combine in a 2:1 ratio to form water, Cavendish did not see that result likely because his 
process/instruments used to produce the two gases allowed impurities. 
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 The next step is tricky. The wording of Cavendish’s explanation of his results 
makes it difficult to determine exactly what he thought. He wrote: “there seems to the 
utmost reason to think, that dephlogisticated air is only water deprived of its phlogiston, 
and that inflammable air is either phlogisticated water or else pure phlogiston; but in all 
probably the former” (Cavendish, 1784, p. 140).  Cavendish’s wording might mean: 1) 
that dephlogisticated air is essentially water missing an inconsequential part; or 2) that 
dephlogisticated air is water missing an essential part.  If first interpretation is true, then 
Cavendish kept with Stahl’s conceptual system.  If the second interpretation is correct, 
then Cavendish suggested a change in Stahl’s conceptual system—classifying water as a 
compound instead of an element.5 Whatever the case may be, there are instances of 
hesitation in Cavendish’s publications to reclassify water as a compound, rather than as a 
simple substance.6  
Watt was more explicit and less hesitant. Watt (1784) concluded and maintained 
from Priestley’s and Cavendish’s prior experiments, that water is a compound that 
consists of inflammable and dephlogisticated airs. While Watt generally worked within 
Stahl’s conceptual system, his explanation of Priestly’s and Cavendish’s experiments 
requires a reclassification of water from element to compound. 
Watt concluded that the experimental observations suggested the following 
reaction, written with modern technique:  
 
                                                
5 Even if the second interpretation were right, Watt had already explained some of Priestley’s 
results by reclassifying water from element to compound.  Cavendish knew this because Watt had 
presented those ideas to the Royal Society (1784). 
6 It is a matter of historical tension whether Cavendish knew of Watt’s interpretation of 
Priestley’s experiments prior to making his own conclusions.  Therefore if the second reading of 
Cavendish is correct, then it might be said that Cavendish and Watt arrived at similar conclusions, 
independently. 
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‘Inflammable Air’(g) + ‘Dephlogisticated Air’(g)  Water(l) + Latent Heat 
Equation 3.2. I have written the names of the chemical entities as Watt originally 
conceived them.  I added subscripts that indicate the state of the entities: (g) indicates a gas, (l) 
indicates a liquid, and (s) indicates a solid. 
 
Watt maintained that the union of inflammable and dephlogisticated airs produces water, 
and, due to the state change, latent heat is released.7 The same year that Cavendish 
published Experiments on Air, Watt read a paper to the Royal Society suggesting that 
“phlogisticated air unites completely with about twice its bulk of the inflammable air 
from metals” (Watt, 1784, p. 349), which he had deduced from Priestly, and Cavendish’s 
experiments.   
 Watt’s explanation of the observations of Priestly and Cavendish came to be 
















Figure 3.1.  Fragment of the reorganization of Stahl’s conceptual theory given Watt’s 
reclassification of water to compound.  
 
 
                                                
7 Cavendish acknowledges and distances himself from Watt’s position in Experiments on Air.  














Lavoisier’s Reinterpretation of Water’s Parts 
 
 Both Watt and Cavendish stress that Antoine Lavoisier, a scientist in France, was 
kept apprised of their experiments and conclusions.  On a trip to France, Watt himself 
relayed some of Priestley’s relevant experiments directly to Lavoisier (Blagden, (n.d), p. 
70), and Cavendish mentions instances of his aides sharing his results with members of 
Lavoisier’s circle, which Lavoisier then replicated on a larger scale (Cavendish, 1784, p. 
134). 
 Repeating Cavendish’s experiment while aware of Watt’s and Cavendish’s 
conclusions, Lavoisier arrived at the same conclusions, namely, that water is a compound 
of two substances (Lavoisier, trans. 1790, p. 83).  However, he fit those observations with 
his conceptual system that had eliminated phlogiston, and, thereby, reclassified the 
constituents into oxygen and hydrogen (Lavoisier, trans. 1790, p. 88-90).8   
 Lavoisier’s real contribution is this:  where Watt and Cavendish saw the union of 
dephlogisticated and inflammable airs, Lavoisier saw the union of two different kinds of 
elements: oxygen and hydrogen.  True, there are similarities: Lavoisier’s conclusion and 
the conclusion of his English contemporaries both reclassified water from element to 
compound.  But Lavoisier and his circle did not use Stahl’s conceptual system to describe 
                                                
8 Blagden wrote in a letter to Dr. Crell, which is not dated, “But those conclusions (Watt and 
Cavendish’s) opened the way to Mr. Lavoisier’s present theory, which perfectly agrees with that 
of Mr. Cavendish; only that Mr. Lavoisier accommodates it to his old theory, which banishes 
phlogiston.  Mr. Monge’s experiments, (of which Mr. Lavoisier speaks as if he made about the 
same time) were really not made until pretty long, I believe at least two months, later than Mr. 
Lavoisier’s own, and were undertaken on receiving information of them.  The course of all this 
history will clearly convince you that Mr. Lavoisier, (instead of being led to the discovery, by 
following up the experiments which he and Mr. Buequet had commenced in 1777) was induced to 
institute again such experiments, solely by the account he received from me, and out English 
experiments; and that he really discovered nothing, but what had before been pointed out to him 
to have been previously made out, and demonstrated in England” (Blagden, (n.d), p.73). 
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the constituents of water.  Instead he devised a new one and conceived of the constituents 
in terms of that system. 
 Lavoisier’s experiments on the composition of water had been prompted by 
experiments across the Channel; and Lavoisier had been aware of the conclusions drawn 
from them, but Lavoisier completely reformulated those conclusions without 
PHLOGISTON.  Lavoisier (1789) described the following observations written with some 
modern technique:  
2H(g) + O(g)  H2O(l) 
 Equation 3.3. H represents hydrogen, O oxygen.  I added subscripts that indicate the state of 
the entities: (g) indicates a gas, (l) indicates a liquid, and (s) indicates a solid 
 
Conclusion 
 This stage in historical development of the concept of water is marked by two 
major changes: 1) a reclassification of water from element to compound; and 2) a 
reinterpretation of water’s component parts.  The Birmingham natural philosophers 
unwittingly isolated water’s parts, and noticed an anomalous dew formation when 
conducting experiments with those parts.  Cavendish and Watt concluded that the dew 
was water and inferred that water is not an element, but rather, a compound.  Cavendish 
and Watt described water’s parts with phlogiston, an entity that proved nonexistent.  
Lavoisier then reinterpreted the components without phlogiston.  We continue to use 





20th and 21st Century Developments  
 
Introduction 
The 20th and 21st century evolution of the concept of water has been relatively 
uneventful compared to the dramatic reorganization and reclassification that marked 
earlier periods.  This chapter investigates the contemporary period, extending back to the 
early 20th century.  I argue that it has been characterized by an ongoing project to isolate, 
observe, and understand mass variant H2O molecules.  Again, I shall emphasize the 
conceptual changes that separate this period from the last.  
The scientific history of this period will demonstrate two things: 1) this period is 
marked by the differentiation of WATER; and 2) it is an open question as to whether mass 
variant water molecules are different types of water, or different kinds of molecules 
altogether.  
 
Isotopes and Differentiating H2O Molecules  
Since Lavoisier, we have continued to describe water as two-parts hydrogen and 
one-part oxygen.9  Our understanding of chemistry, of course, has deepened, and our 
understanding of water has deepened, too.  We are beginning to understand water’s 
unusual properties, and have started to differentiate it from other liquids that share its 
                                                
9 We have continued to describe water as two-parts hydrogen and one-part oxygen, but the meanings of the 
concepts HYDROGEN and OXYGEN have changed.  Paul Needham (2002) noted that it was not until Dalton 
that these concepts were understood with an atomist model. 
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basic constituent parts (i.e. hydrogen and oxygen) but differ by mass and chemical 
properties.  
In the early 20th century chemists speculated that the mass of an element was not 
homogenous across the board: that is, not all instances of that one atom had identical 
atomic masses.  The initial research in this direction suggested the isotopic theory: an 
atom of one kind is a heterogeneous mixture of atoms with different physical intra-atomic 
structures, but homogenous chemical properties, aside for some properties that directly 
depend on atomic mass.  Moreover, these mass variant atoms occupy the same position in 
the Periodic Table because their positive and negative charges coincide with that position 
(Soddy, 1913, p. 399-400).   Fredrick Soddy framed this theory, and mass variant atoms 
of one kind were henceforth called isotopes, which is Greek for “at the same place.”  The 
reasoning is simple: many physically distinguishable entities occupied the same space on 
the periodic table. 
 Fredrick Soddy’s theory of isotopes was a result of his research, which suggested 
that the radioactive atoms had isotopes (Soddy, 1922, p. 372).  But the isotope theory 
remained simply a suggestion until Francis Aston’s work in mass spectroscopy validated 
it, and extended the isotopic atoms beyond the radioactive ones (Aston, 1920, p. 617). 
Aston measured the atomic masses of chemically homogenous atoms using a mass 
spectrometer, which indicated the presence of isotopes.  He continued his research and by 
the time he had received the Nobel Prize with Soddy for his work, he had isolated 212 of 
them (Aston, 1922, p. 16).    
 The discovery of isotopes was a significant moment in the history of chemistry.  
In fact, chemists were generally relieved.  Scientists had assigned hydrogen the atomic 
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mass one, and expected the masses of all other atoms to be whole number multiples.  To 
their surprise, most of their observations yielded atomic masses with significant 
remainders.  Soddy’s and Aston’s discoveries explained these observations: scientists had 
been measuring the mass of a heterogeneous mixture of isotopes, and each isotope had a 
different mass.  The remainder had been explained as an average of atoms with the same 
number of protons and electrons but different masses. 
 Approximately twenty years later Harold Urey, then assistant professor of 
chemistry at Columbia University, began to wonder if the smallest atom—hydrogen—
also had isotopes (Palmer, 1934, para. 7).  Urey presumed that hydrogen’s first isotope 
must be double its mass because hydrogen is assigned an atomic mass of one, and if the 
whole number hypothesis is right, then the next available mass is two (Urey, 1932, p. 4). 
And since there exists a relationship between atomic mass and volatility, Urey was able 
to predict that the heavier hydrogen would be less volatile, and he was therefore able to 
separate the two hydrogens by distillation (Urey, 1932, p. 6).  The spectroscopic method 
was applied to the distilled hydrogen, which confirmed a mass doubling.  Following the 
publication of this work in 1932, Urey was awarded the Nobel Prize. 
 Urey’s discovery had immediate implications for our understanding of water, 
which professor W. Palmer (1934) recognized, and noted in his Nobel Prize ceremony 
speech.  Palmer noticed two implications: 1) if the hydrogen atoms in a water molecule 
are replaced by hydrogen’s first isotope, then the mass ratio is such that there is a greater 
proportion of hydrogen in the water molecule; and 2) the mass of the entire molecule will 




The smallest particles of water, its molecules, are regarded as consisting of two 
atoms of hydrogen, with atomic weight 1, and one atom of oxygen, with atomic 
weight 16. As the whole molecule, taking the atomic weight of hydrogen as the 
unit, thus weights 18, water ought to consist of hydrogen to the extent of 2/18 or 
1/9, i.e. to about 11%, the remainder being oxygen. If, however, the two 
hydrogen atoms are replaced by the atoms of the isotope, which are twice as 
heavy, the water will consist of four parts by weight of hydrogen and sixteen 
parts by weight of oxygen, i.e. will contain 20% of hydrogen. It should also be 
heavier, inasmuch as each particle is heavier in the proportion of 20 to 18.  
(Palmer, 1934, para. 10) 
 
 While Urey was working on isotopic hydrogen, James Chadwick had been 
investigating the effects of a certain type of radiation on atoms.  The data he gathered was 
best explained with the existence of a new subatomic particle, the neutron, with a mass 
one and charge zero (Chadwick, 1932, p. 312).  The existence of the neutron fit perfectly 
with the theory of isotopes.  It explained the mass variance between atoms with the same 
number of protons and electrons. 
Water’s first mass variant was dubbed “heavy water”, and given the chemical 
formula D2O or 2H2O.  Its additional mass was accounted for by the addition of a neutron. 
The ‘D’ in D2O stands for deuterium, a hydrogen atom with a proton and a neutron. The 
superscript “2”, in the second notation, signifies the additional neutron on the hydrogen 
atom.   
Mass and proportion were not the only differences, however.  While scientists had 
not noticed any chemical differences of isotopic atoms, scientists at Berkeley reported 
many important different chemical properties in the mass variation of molecular water. 
Heavy water cannot support life in its pure state; heavy water’s freezing point is almost 
four degrees higher than water’s; its boiling point is one and a half degrees higher; and 
heavy water can dissolve less salts, and is more viscous (Lewis, 1933, p.3503-3504 
Lewis, 1934, p. 151-153).  
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Quantum Effects Explain the Differences  
 Scientists are now beginning to understand the reasons for these observed 
chemical differences, and not surprisingly, the additional neutrons, they think, are the 
cause.  The neutrons add mass to the nucleus of the molecule.  Equations in quantum 
mechanics are used to determine bond energies and those equations partly depend on the 
mass of an atom’s nucleus.   Soper and Benmore (2008) used experimental techniques to 
show how the geometry of H2O and D2O differ.  Geometrically, H2O has a longer 
intramolecular OH bond than D2O’s corresponding OD bond (Soper & Benmore, 2008, 
p. 2); furthermore, the intermolecular bond is shorter in H2O than D2O. The intra and 
intermolecular bond lengths are not simply different from an H2O molecule, but the 
length differences vary.  These differences result in geometric variations between H2O 
and D2O (Soper & Benmore, 2008, p. 1). Without going into the specifics: H2O has a 
broader structure than D2O (Soper & Benmore, 2008, p. 1).  In other words, H2O takes up 
more space.  The geometric difference is attributed to “the increased quantization of the 
proton compared to the deuteron [a proton and a neutron]” (Soper & Benmore, 2008, p. 
4), and quantization depends mass.   
Mass alters bond energies, which can be used to predict the behaviour of 
molecules.  The great the mass of a molecule the more classically it will behave; 
however, the smaller the mass the more quantum effects will be pronounced.  The 
property differences between H2O and D2O have been attributed to the different masses, 
and, therefore, the strength of quantum effects. 
 D2O is not the only mass variant water molecule. Scientists have identified 
another mass variant water molecule, T2O, which resembles H2O in appearance, but does 
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not have the same properties.  The hydrogen atoms of the T2O molecule each have two 
neutrons.  These two neutron hydrogen atoms are denoted with a T.  Not only does T2O 
not share H2O’s properties, but also in its pure state it is radioactive, corrosive, and 
carcinogenic (Doe Handbook, 1991, p.6-7; Yin et al., 2002). 
 The differences are not obvious because in any volume of naturally occurring 
H2O there are only traces of D2O and T2O.  In such a state, the properties of these 
isotopes do not manifest themselves.  Only in higher relative concentrations do we notice 
the properties of these mass variant water molecules. 
 D2O and T2O are mass variant water molecules, but in these instances only the 
hydrogen is isotopic (2H and 3H, or deuterium and titanium). There are, however, 
naturally occurring mass variant water molecules whereby the oxygen atom is isotopic, 
not the hydrogen.  Oxygen has three naturally occurring isotopes, but I shall only 
consider one, 18O.  H218O is of significant interest to meteorologists who have reported 
that it takes more energy to vaporize (Harmon, 1961, p. 1702). This difference has 
important implications for atmospheric models because it will allow for better 
predictions. 
 
What Do The Differences Mean? 
 These discoveries mark a period of rapid differentiation of WATER.  This period 
is, as I have mentioned, ongoing, and, therefore, the details of the changes are not yet 
clear.  As far as I can tell there are two options: 1) divide WATER into different types; or 




    
  






Figure 6.0. The figure represents one possible interpretation of the effects of the current 
work of scientists. In other worlds, we think of the mass variation of molecular water. Straight 












Figure 6.1.  This figure represents another possible interpretation of the differentiation 
that is currently going on in chemistry.  Each molecule is considered a separate compound 
different from each other, and different from water.   
 
Currently, I think, scientists are learning toward the first model.  However, there is some 
controversy, and the nomenclature appears to be a manifestation of it.  The International 
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) prefers a nomenclature that signals an 
















superscript in front of the atom designating its number of neutrons.  For instance, D2O is 
written 2H2O if the accepted nomenclature is followed.  
 Chemists and physicists seem to prefer D2O, however. If protons and elections 
make the differences, then it seems right to think of mass varied molecular water as 
types.  Then again, if properties make the differences, it seems better to think of water’s 
isotopes as kinds: each a different compound.  The D2O nomenclature makes sense if 
properties are what are important, but the 2H2O nomenclature makes sense if protons and 




 Differentiation characterizes this period in the historical development of 
WATER—H2O is different from D2O, which is different from T2O, which is different from 
H218O.  The number of neutrons differs, and, as a result, the mass of each molecule 
differs.  Scientists think that the mass differentials are responsible for important property 
differences between the molecules. I have suggested that this process of differentiation 
means one of two things: 1) isotopes continue to fit the category built from protons and 
elections; or 2) neutrons become a distinguishing feature, and as a result, isotopes are 






Chapter 5  





 Chapters two, three, and four told the history of the concept of water.  Conceptual 
change is an important part of that narrative: differentiation, coalescence, reorganization, 
reclassification, and redescription.  These conceptual changes signal different 
developments in the history of WATER, suggesting that theory plays an important role in 
the meaning of concepts.  Despite these conceptual shifts when enough historical data are 
available, it is clear that communication happens across theories.   
 I shall now put the history to task and evaluate the expected histories associated 
with the three answers that I proposed to the question, on what does the meaning of the 
concept of water depend?   
 The first answer, recall, is that the physical world determines the meaning of the 
concept of water.  I shall demonstrate the historical predictions associated with this view 
are inconsistent with the history of the concept of water, which is characterized by 
dramatic conceptual shifts.  
 The second answer I consider is that a theory determines the meaning of the 
concept of water.  Kuhn’s (1961) historical analysis of scientific development supports 
that view.  I shall demonstrate that this answer is inconsistent with the history of the 
concept of water, and that Kuhn’s historical analysis overlooked communication across 
theories in the history of science.  
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 The third answer I shall evaluate is that the meaning of the concept of water 
depends on both the world and a theory.  Of the three answers, the third best fits the 
history of the concept of water because part of the expected history associated with the 
first and second answers match the actual historical development of the concept of water.  
Given that elements of both M1 and M2 are consistent with the actual history, a better 
understanding of WATER’S history should include both the physical world and theory.  
The physical world explains cross theory communication because the physical world is 
relatively stable, and stability is required for communication.  Theory explains the sharp 
conceptual shifts that characterize WATER’S history because it is relatively volatile.   
 Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment is meant to show that the meaning of a 
term and its corresponding concept depends on the physical world and the theory in 
which it is embedded.  That conclusion is right, but Putnam’s thought experiment is not 
the reason it is right.   The Twin Earth thought experiment includes at least one 
chemically improbable assumption, suggesting that the results of that experiment are not 
supported by the experiment itself.  The history of the concept water does, however, 
support Putnam’s conclusion.  
 
Evaluation of the Historical Scenario One 
 The first historical scenario is tied to the idea that the physical world determines 
the meaning of WATER.  M1 suggests a history whereby concepts are stable, and as a 
result, communication is possible.   
That suggested history, however, is partly inconsistent with the history of WATER.  
WATER is not a stable concept.  As seen in Chapter One, the pre-scientific Greeks had 
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many concepts associated with water.  The pre-scientific Greeks had personified fresh 
water and ocean water with primordial gods, which means that the pre-scientific Greeks 
had concepts of fresh water and ocean water.  If the other gods of the Greek Pantheon are 
included in the discussion, then the number of concepts connected to water multiplies 
dramatically.  
Thales collapsed the pre-scientific water related concepts.  He thought water was 
the material cause of all things, and that everything was a modification or transformation 
of it.  In other words, water was every substance, material, or object.  The concepts FIRE, 
AIR, and EARTH were differentiated from each other by their state.  This meant that 
Thales had used a natural entity, not supernatural ones, to organize concepts in a 
hierarchical system.  In this case, how they relate to water. 
 Aristotle revised Thales’ conceptual system.  Water, he thought, could not be the 
only elemental substance because it did not account for the apparent opposition of earth 
and fire, and water and air.  If all things are modifications of water, he reasoned, we 
should not observe such opposition.  Therefore he reclassified earth, fire, air, and aether 
as elementary substances whereas Thales thought water was the only substance, and 
earth, fire, air were different manifestations of water.  
 Skipping ahead nearly two thousand years, the Birmingham natural philosophers 
of the 18th century who had been working within Stahl’s conceptual system had 
discovered water’s parts.  Priestly and Cavendish had been conducting experiments on 
air, both isolating many kinds.  Unwittingly Priestly had isolated one part of H2O, and 
Cavendish the other.  Influenced by Stahl’s conceptual system, they described these parts 
as dephlogisticated and inflammable air.  Subsequent experimental observations 
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suggested to Watt and Cavendish that water was the product of these airs, and 
consequently, water was reclassified as a compound, not an element.   
The current period in the evolution of WATER is a case of differentiation.  
Currently scientists have been investigating mass variations of molecular H2O.  The 
physical differences produce chemical differences observable at the macro level.  How 
scientists classify these differences, however, seems an open question.  Nonetheless this 
period is characterized by differentiation.  
These conceptual changes are inconsistent with the seamless history expected 
from a concept that the physical world had fixed.  The meaning of WATER was different 
at each point that I have documented.  The meaning of WATER for the pre-scientific 
Greeks is probably closer to our concept LIQUID.  Just as there are different kinds of 
liquids for us, the pre-scientific Greeks thought there were different kinds of water.10  For 
Thales, the concept of water resembled our concept MATTER; and Aristotle had classified 
water as an element.   
The Birmingham natural philosophers reclassified water as a compound.  They 
described water’s parts with PHLOGISTON connecting WATER’S meaning with it too.  
Lavoisier accepted water’s reclassification; however, he rejected its link to PHLOGISTON, 
and redescribed water’s parts describing them with new concepts HYDROGEN and 
OXYGEN, altering its meaning again. 
Recently, scientists began investigating the observable chemical differences 
between H2O and mass variant water molecules.  The results suggest that mass variant 
H2O molecules have observably different chemical properties.  What those differences 
                                                
10 As far as I can tell there is no god in the Greek Pantheon that personifies water generally.  All 
the Greek water deities are associated with observable properties of water or natural 
manifestations of it.  
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mean, however, is unsettled.  One thing is clear, however, the meaning of WATER is now 
connected to the meaning of ISOTOPE because isotopic theory is used to understand the 
differences between mass variant water molecules.  This new association adjusted the 
meaning of WATER again. 
These conceptual shifts show the instability of the historical development of the 
concept of water.  That instability is contrary to the relatively stable history predicted by 
M1, and, thereby, serves as evidence against that account of meaning. 
 
Evaluation of the Second Historical Scenario  
The second historical scenario follows from the claim that the meaning of a 
concept depends on a theory.  Behind that claim is the view that theory determines the 
world because it shapes our observations, and, thereby, our concepts.  If a theory 
determines the meaning of a concept in this way, then concepts should not be stable at 
all; instead, they should change with theory change.  As a result, people working within 
different theories ought to be unable to communicate, given that the meanings of the 
concepts they would be using would differ (Kuhn, 1961, p.149).   
 The trouble with this view is that communication happens across theories.  When 
enough historical data is available the record shows that cross-theory communication 
happens and it is beneficial.  Given that communication takes place and is beneficial, a 
theory can only be part of the picture.  If it were the entire picture, then cross-theory 
communication would not be part of the historical record.  Though Kuhn had anticipated 
the historical inaccuracy of the conclusion of the Twin Earth thought experiment, he did 
not think that cross-theory communication would feature in the historical development of 
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WATER.  Perhaps that is why he thought that WATER and other concepts like it were 
theory-dependent (Kuhn, 1989; 1990).11 
 The Birmingham natural philosophers had made experimental observations that 
suggested that water was a compound.  They described their observations using Stahl’s 
conceptual system, and consequently, understood water’s parts with PHLOGISTON.  The 
historical evidence suggests that these experiments and the observations drawn from 
them had been relayed to Lavoisier.  Lavoisier had replicated them and agreed that water 
should be reclassified as a compound; however he interpreted its parts without 
PHILOGISTON.  Instead he thought the parts were hydrogen and oxygen. 
 
Historical Critique of Kuhn’s Non-Communicative Thesis 
 Historically speaking, the further one goes back the less historical data are 
available.  Recent history, however, is better documented.  For that reason, I want to 
focus on a relatively recent conceptual shift in the historical development of WATER to 
show that the historical record contradicts Kuhn’s conjecture that cross-theory 
communication is impossible.  The conjecture follows from the view that a concept’s 
meaning depends only on the theory in which it is embedded, and, therefore, changes 
when a theory changes.  I shall examine the conceptual shift between the Birmingham 
natural philosophers and Lavoisier.   
                                                
11 Kuhn argues that it was not until the Chemical Revolution that the “distinction between solids, liquids, 
and gases became physical, not a chemical” (Kuhn, 1989, 82).  If Kuhn is right, then the different states of 
water (solid, liquid, gas) were differentiated chemically not physically prior to Lavoisier.  This adds an 
additional level of conceptual change to the concept that refers to water.  Paul Needham (2000) made a 
similar point in What is Water? 
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 Recall from chapter three that the Birmingham natural philosophers had made 
experimental observations that suggested water was not elementary, but composed of 
parts.  As a result the Birmingham natural philosophers reclassified water, grouping it 
with the compounds.  Lavoisier was informed of these experiments, the observations, and 
Watt and Cavendish’s conclusions.  He replicated their experiments and agreed with the 
reclassification of water, but understood water’s parts differently.   
 There are three historical facts that show that communication happens between 
people of different theoretical standpoints:  1) the Birmingham natural philosophers 
replayed their experiments to Lavoisier; 2) Lavoisier was privy to Cavendish’s and 
Watt’s experimental conclusions; and 3) the Birmingham natural philosophers 
complained that Lavoisier’s ‘discovery’ amounted to nothing more than Cavendish’s and 
Watt’s idea repackaged without Stahl’s conceptual system, especially phlogiston.   
 Lavoisier had been given an account of the experiments that Priestly and 
Cavendish had designed, which suggested that water was not an element, but a compound 
(Blagden, (n.d), p. 73).  Lavoisier duplicated those experiments on a larger scale.  The 
experiments are complicated, and duplication requires precision and accuracy. The 
experimental apparatus must be so, the exact substances must be used, and certain 
variables must be controlled.  That requires a lot of communication, and a lot of 
understanding.  If those specifics are not communicated well, then there is a good chance 
the experiment will not be successfully replicated.  Remember, Lavoisier and the 
Birmingham natural philosophers were working within different theories, which differed 
on the issues at hand.  But Lavoisier was still able to duplicate those experiments.  That 
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duplication suggests that cross-theory communication occurred between the Birmingham 
natural philosophers and Lavoisier.   
 Lavoisier not only duplicated the English experiments, but he had also been kept 
apprised of conclusions that the English had drawn from the experimental observations; 
namely, water is a compound, not an element (Blagden, (n.d), p. 71-74).  Not 
surprisingly, Lavoisier had drawn the same conclusion.  The only difference between 
Lavoisier’s conclusion, and Cavendish’s and Watt’s was the description of the parts.  The 
fact that Lavoisier was aware of the conclusions of the English scientists, suggests that he 
understood them, and that they helped guide his own.   
 The historical evidence suggests that the experiments and conclusions of the 
English influenced Lavoisier.  The English had even accused Lavoisier of stealing Watt’s 
idea and simply expressing it without PHLOGISTON.  Lavoisier’s conclusion that water is 
composed of hydrogen and oxygen is, Watt’s peers say, agreeable with his conclusion 
had Watt had not used phlogiston to interpret water’s parts (Blagden, (n.d), p. 71-72).  
Blagden, a contemporary of Cavendish and Watt, claimed, “[Watt’s conclusion] opened 
the way for Lavoisier’s present theory, which perfectly agrees with Mr. Watt’s, only that 
Lavoisier accommodates it to his old theory, which banishes phlogiston” (Blagden, (n.d), 
p. 73).  The Birmingham natural philosophers and Lavoisier not only communicated, but 
the some English scientists thought that Watt’s conclusion could be translated into 
Lavoisier’s.   
 
Evaluation of the Third Historical Scenario  
 
 The third historical scenario follows from the claim that meaning depends on the 
physical world and the theory in which it is embedded.  For this scenario to be consistent 
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with the actual history of WATER’S historical development, parts of the prior two 
scenarios must be correct, but other parts incorrect.  In other words, some of the historical 
expectations associated with M1 and M2 must be consistent with the actual history of 
WATER. 
 Recall, the historical scenario associated with M1 had two features: 1) historically 
stable concepts; and 2) cross-theory communication.  And we expected the reverse from 
meaning account M2: 1) historically volatile concepts; and 2) the inability to 
communicate across theories.   
 The concept of water has undergone many dramatic conceptual shifts; however, 
there is historical evidence that communication between 18th and 19th century scientists 
who worked within different conceptual systems took place. 
 One feature of both M1 and M2 is consistent with the actual history of WATER, 
but one feature of each is inconsistent with WATER’S history, which suggests that M1 and 
M2 are both partly right, but also partly wrong.  A better account of the actual historical 
development of the concept of water includes both factors, M3. 
 The world factor explains cross-theory communication because the objects that 
are being discussed do not change.  Should the meaning of WATER include that stable 
factor, cross-theory communication should be possible.  The concept of water in one 
theory and the concept of water in another will have different meanings, but part of their 
meanings should be shared, and that part is owed to the physical world.  That shared 
element allows for communication.  Cross-theory communication may be difficult, but it 
happens and is beneficial. 
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 The theory factor explains the dramatic conceptual shifts that characterize the 
history of the concept of water.  Conceptual systems change a lot.  The categories that are 
made, and the connections that link one concept to the others alters depending on the 
theory or theories that help shape view of the world.  
When theory pushes, the world pushes back.  The history of WATER suggests that 
the meaning of the concept of water depends on the physical world and the theory in 
which it is embedded.  The stability of the physical world explains the cross-theory 
communication associated with WATER’S history; and the tendency for theory to change 
explains the dramatic conceptual shifts.  
 
A Chemical Critique of a Twin Earth Assumption 
 The history of the concept of water is evidence for M3 and Putnam’s conclusion 
that the meaning depends on both the physical world and the theory in which it is 
embedded.  Putnam’s conclusion is right, but he reaches that conclusion for the wrong 
reason.   
 Putnam designed a thought experiment to show that two people can be in exactly 
the same brain state at the same time of an utterance, yet mean two different things.  This 
is supposeed to show that the meaning of a concept not only depends on the theory in 
which it is embedded but also the physical world. 
Putnam’s story goes like this: Suppose there exists another planet that is a near 
copy of this one, Twin Earth.  Each person from Earth has a double on Twin Earth who 
has precisely the same physiology.  And the world is a near exact copy, except for one 
difference, on Earth water, abbreviated waterE, is H2O, but on Twin Earth water, 
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abbreviated waterTE, is a very long complicated formula abbreviated by XYZ.  WaterE 
and waterTE are different things with different physical structures. Note: Putnam 
stipulates that H2O and XYZ are indistinguishable at normal pressures and temperatures, 
and XYZ fills seas and oceans on Twin Earth in the same way H2O does on this planet.  
In other words, H2O and XYZ are visibly indistinguishable.   
Now imagine somebody from Earth visited Twin Earth.  On first blush, he would 
report that “water” has the same meaning on Twin Earth as it does on Earth.  This report 
would be corrected, however, once it is learned that waterE is H2O and waterTE is XYZ. 
Here’s the crucial part: waterE and waterTE, have two different meanings.  
However by stipulation of the thought experiment, they share the same observable 
properties and occupy the same kinds of spaces on both worlds.  In other words, waterE 
and waterTE are applied to the same set of things.  Now remember, Earth and Twin Earth 
are identical except for the physical composition of water, and the speakers are in the 
exact same mental states.  If you conclude that the meaning of waterE and waterTE differ 
between worlds, you must think that that difference is a consequence of the physical 
world, not a theory.    
 Putnam accounts for any addition or subtraction to the set of things denoted by 
“water” with what he calls the ‘ostensive definition’ of the term.  Any ostensive 
definition of a term is accompanied by the following empirical presupposition:  If we 
denote thing-X “water”, and we call thing-Y “water”, then we presume that thing-X 
stands in a kind of sameness relation to thing-Y.  The sameness relation has two parts:  1) 
X and Y are both liquids; and 2) X and Y agree on the important physical properties.  
Putnam recognizes that ‘importance’ is an interest relative-notion, and is thereby 
 47 
determined by the experts in a social context (Putnam, 1975, p. 238-239).  If scientific 
investigation reveals that thing-Y is, in fact, not the same as thing-X, then we will alter 
our speech patterns to accommodate that finding, and come to accept that our previous 
speech was mistaken.  
 The upshot is this: scientific investigation changes our understanding of concepts; 
scientific investigation may reveal that we have been misapplying a term.  That 
information will revise our manner of speaking.  But those things do not mean that the 
meaning of the term has changed.  What changed, says Putnam, is our knowledge 
(Putnam, 1975, p. 225-227).   
 The history of WATER suggests a manner to evaluate Putnam’s thought 
experiment.  Differentiation characterizes the evolution of WATER in the 20th and 21st 
centuries; scientists have begun distinguishing between mass variant water molecules.  
They noticed that mass variant water molecules have different observable chemical 
properties, and believe that those differences can be attributed to the mass differences.  In 
particular, scientists believe that water’s properties are due to its rather small molecular 
mass.  As seen in Chapter Five, heavy water does not share those properties because the 
two additional neutrons modify the mass of the molecule to such an extent that it behaves 
more like a classical molecule.  This information suggests two chemical reasons for the 
improbability that XYZ is chemically indistinguishable from H2O, but physically 
different:  1) small physical differences make big chemical differences; and 2) chemical 
analysis suggests that it is improbable that any molecule with a mass less than 20u (20 
atomic mass units) would be chemically distinguishable from H2O. 
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 The first lesson worth applying to Putnam’s thought experiment is that small 
physical changes make noticeable chemical differences.  The addition of two neutrons to 
the H2O molecule dramatically changes its chemical properties.  If the addition of two 
neutrons causes dramatic chemical effects, then why should we think that a molecule so 
large that abbreviation is required has all the same macro chemical properties of H2O?  
D2O, T2O and H218O are all chemically distinguishable from H2O; furthermore, 
the chemical differences have even more dramatic consequences in large biological 
systems.  As seen in Chapter Four, If either D2O or T2O replaced H2O, life would end, 
except for some microbial organisms that do not require H2O and are unaffected by D2O 
or T2O chemical properties.  Pure D2O is toxic and pure T2O is corrosive and 
carcinogenic. If H218O replaced all atmospheric H2O, then there would be noticeable 
atmospheric consequences because H218O requires more energy to vaporize (Harmon, 
1961, p. 1702).  Now if these small molecular changes have such pronounced effects, it is 
unreasonable to ask us to imagine a hypothetical scenario where XYZ shares H2O’s 
chemical properties but is dramatically physically different.  
 If that is not convincing, there is another reason to think that XYZ cannot be 
chemically indistinguishable from H2O:  if D2O’s properties are different from H2O’s 
properties because its molecular mass is too high, then we have a necessary condition for 
a molecule to share H2O’s properties.  
The molecular mass of H2O is approximately 18u, and the molecular mass of D2O 
is approximately 20u.  Given that D2O’s mass is sufficiently high that it does not share 
H2O’s properties, we are able to conclude that any molecule with a mass higher than 20u, 
cannot have H2O’s properties.  After all, scientists attribute H2O’s properties to its small 
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molecular mass; and D2O’s properties to its larger molecular mass.  Therefore, 20u is the 
benchmark: if a molecule has a mass lower than 20u, it may share H2O’s properties; but 
if not, then it should behave like a classical molecule with dramatically different chemical 
properties.   
  Now that we have a limit, we can perform some calculations.  With a quick 
glance at the Periodic Table we know that there are eight elements that could form 
compounds whereby the resultant molecular mass is less than 20u:  hydrogen, helium, 
lithium, beryllium, boron, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen.  We cannot include fluorine 
because its atomic mass is 19u; therefore, any compound it forms cannot be less than 
20u.  
 I rounded the molecular masses of these elements to the nearest whole number, 
and then wrote an algorithm to determine the number of mathematical molecular 
combinations with a mass less than 20u.  Given that these molecules have a molecular 
mass less than 20u, they all meet the necessary condition for quantum effects, which are 
necessary for H2O’s peculiar chemical properties. 
The algorithm’s results are all the possible mathematical combinations, not the 
chemically possible combinations.  The set of mathematically possible combinations is 
larger than the set of chemically possible combinations, but each chemically possible 
combination is a member of the mathematical set.  The result is 154 mathematically 
possible combinations.   
 Now of those 154 molecules we eliminate 77 off the bat.  These molecules, in all 
likelihood, will not exist in nature because they contain helium.  Helium’s outermost 
valence shell has a complete octet; that is, it contains eight electrons.  As a result it is 
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exceptionally unreactive, and incredibly unlikely to naturally form bonds with any other 
element.  If we subtract those chemically impossible combinations, we are left with 77 
chemical possibilities.   
 On inspection we can also eliminate all molecules that are entirely composed of 
hydrogen, except for H2 because it naturally forms in a gaseous state.  Hydrogen forms 
compounds with the highly electronegative halogens, and the less electronegative metals 
and metalloids; however, H2 does not bond with itself to form chains of three or more 
hydrogens.  Therefore, it is possible to eliminate all molecules that entirely consist of 
hydrogen, except H2.  Since hydrogen has an atomic mass of approximately one, this 
eliminates a total of 17 molecules, bringing our total possibilities to 61.   
 Now the process of elimination becomes a bit more complicated.  Mathematically 
speaking, a significant number of the remaining molecules would be ions: 56. An ion is 
an atom or molecule that has an unequal number of electrons and protons.  Ions have 
special properties because of their charges; for that reason we should exclude them as 
candidates.  They are unlikely to share the exact same properties as water. The remaining 
possibilities are five molecules.  But since H2O is itself part of this group, there are only 
four possibilities. 
 The possibilities are H2, CH4, BH5, and NH3.  H2 is a gas at normal pressures and 
temperatures so it is not a candidate. All boron-hydrogen compounds are toxic and highly 
flammable.  CH4, colloquially known as methane, does not share H2O’s properties either.  
Being the primary component of natural gas, it is highly flammable. NH3, otherwise 
known as ammonia, is a gas at normal pressures and temperatures, and hazardous.   
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 From the perspective of modern chemistry, it is unreasonable to think that XYZ 
and H2O share the same chemical properties but differ physically.  Chemistry does not 
work that way.  Small physical differences can make big chemical differences.  H2O 
owes its chemical properties to quantum behaviour, which requires a sufficiently small 
mass; therefore, we can eliminate a wide range of candidates for XYZ.  And the ones we 
have left, we know, do not share H2O’s properties.  For these reasons it is clear that 
Putnam has grossly misunderstood the chemistry, and built chemically impossible 
assumptions into the Twin Earth thought experiment.  Therefore the Twin Earth thought 
experiment is seriously misleading.   
 Without the assumption that H2O and XYZ are physically different but 
chemically indistinguishable it is impossible to say that H2O and XYZ are applied to the 
same set of things.  Therefore the difference in meaning might be attributed to the 
different application of the terms to things not its physical structure.  Putnam’s 
assumption had tried to block that possibility by stipulation, but that stipulation is 
chemically unrealistic.   
 
Conclusion  
  The reason that M1 does not capture the complete meaning of WATER is because 
it suggests a seamless historical development of WATER, but conceptual change 
characterizes the actual historical development of WATER.  The actual history contradicts 
the historical prediction of M1, and, therefore, suggests it is an inaccurate description of 
the meaning of WATER. 
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 The historical scenario associated M2 is not entirely right either.  One feature of 
that scenario is the impossibility of cross-theory communication.  The actual history 
contradicts that expected historical scenario.  That historical contradiction suggests that 
M2 does not accurately describe the historical development of WATER. 
 A much better understanding of the meaning of WATER includes both factors.  
Cross-theory communication was expected from M1, and conceptual shifts were 
expected from M2.  For that reason the meaning of the concept of water depends on both 
the world and theory.  The conclusion of the Twin Earth thought experiment is right for 
the same reasons.  However the Twin Earth thought experiment does not support that 
conclusion.  Recent history also suggested a manner to criticize the assumption that 
invisible physical changes may not have visible chemical consequences.  That criticism 
suggests that Putnam had misunderstood the chemistry when he designed the Twin Earth 
thought experiment. 
Conceptual changes are not limited to WATER.  The meanings of Aristotle’s five 
elements have all changed.  Fire is not an element, but rather, the result of rapid oxidation 
in the chemical process of combustion.  The visible part, the flame, consists of glowing 
hot gases.  Air is a mixture that consists of seventeen gaseous atoms and molecules.  It is 
mainly composed of nitrogen, oxygen, argon and carbon dioxide.  Earth is also a mixture.  
If EARTH refers to the earth’s crust, then at least 99% of the crust is a mixture of different 
oxides with SiO2, Al2O3, CaO, and MgO as the major components of that mixture.  
Aether once thought to be the medium of space was eliminated when Einstein’s theory of 
special relativity (1905) could make all the necessary predictions without aether.   
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 Neither M1 nor M2 can wholly explain the history of the concept of water.  
Meaning as only dependent on the physical world cannot explain the conceptual shifts I 
have documented, and meaning as only theory-dependent cannot explain the cross-theory 
communication.  The meaning of WATER is at least dependent on both theory and the 
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